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TACKLING THE MONDAY-MORNING 
QUARTERBACK: 
APPLICATIONS OF HINDSIGHT BIAS 
IN DECISION-MAKING SETTINGS 
Therese A. Louie, Mahesh N. Rajan, and Robert E. Sibley 
San jose State University 
Extant research has focused largely on what causes hindsight distortion. In 
contrast, this work examines applied aspects related to the bias in deci­
sion-making environments. A conceptual framework is provided and re­
cent real-world examples are presented to outline how decision 
makers-and those who observe them-show hindsight effects. Then, 
both negative and positive consequences of the bias are outlined. Strate­
gies are presented to reduce negative effects that occur when decision 
makers show hindsight distortion. Finally, because it is often not possible 
to avoid or to correct others' hindsight-tainted evaluations, suggestions for 
coping with the bias are discussed. 
Human progress depends upon learning from the past. Perhaps that is why 
hindsight bias-wherein outcomes seem more obvious in hindsight than 
they did in foresight (Fischhoff, 1975)-has received so much attention from 
academic researchers (for reviews see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 
1991, and Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004). Although the bias 
can be affected by personality differences (Musch, 2003) and cultural influ­
ences (Pohl, Bender, & Lachmann, 2002), it is prevalent in a wide variety of 
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settings wherein outcome information is known (for a review see Hawkins 
& Hastie, 1990). 
This article provides an overview of applied aspects related to hindsight 
distortion in decision-making environments. First, findings from academic 
research are presented, and are illustrated by scenarios from real-life set­
tings. Then, applied examples provide insights into the costs, as well as the 
benefits, of the bias. Next, the means by which to avoid negative conse­
quences of the bias are discussed. Finally, because it is not always possible to 
avoid hindsight effects, strategies for coping with them are outlined. 
RESEARCH ON HINDSIGHT BIAS IN 
DECISION MAKING SETTINGS 
HINDSIGHT BIAS WHEN OBSERVING 
OTHERS' DECISION OUTCOMES 
Research Findings. The ABI/INFORM and Psychlnfo databases were used 
to find experimental research that focused on hindsight bias for event out­
comes. The list was then narrowed by requesting articles that contained the 
words "decision-making" in their abstracts or key words. 
The research stream is split generally into studies that focused upon indi­
viduals observing others' decisions, and decision makers evaluating their 
own choices. When individuals observe another's decision, they tend to 
show hindsight bias both when outcomes are unfavorable and favorable. 
For example, Bukszar and Connolly (1988) asked three sets of participants to 
read about a managerial decision that took place in a company. The first 
group was given no information about the outcome and was asked to make 
judgments regarding whether or not the result of the decision would be suc­
cessful. A second set of participants was provided with information that the 
decision outcome was unfavorable, and a third group learned that the out­
come was favorable. The last two groups of participants were then asked to 
make "postdictions," or judgments about what they would have predicted 
would happen had they not seen outcome information. When the research­
ers compared the postdiction judgments with the prediction judgments of 
the first group of participants, they found that the outcome was more 
obvious in hindsight than in foresight, regardless of the direction of the 
decision result. 
Although some researchers have found hindsight effects primarily for 
others' unfavorable decision outcomes (Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999; 
Lowe & Reekers, 1994; Menec & Weiner, 2000), many studies have repli­
cated Bukszar and Connolly's (1988) pattern of hindsight findings for both 
unfavorable and favorable outcomes (Connolly & Bukszar, 1990; Louie, 
2005; Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991; Sligo & Stirton, 1998). In addition, the bias 
has been displayed in a wide range of judgment milieus, including those in­
volving healthcare concerns (e.g., Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993), legal is­
sues (e.g., Hastie et al., 1999), consumption experiences (Pohl, Schwarz, 
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Sczesny, & Stahlberg, 2003), and political results (Blank, Fischer, & 
Erdfelder, 2003). 
Real-World Examples. The Enron Corporation story suggests that in 
real-world settings-similar to what was found in theoretical research-ob­
servers show hindsight bias for others' unfavorable and favorable decision 
outcomes. Up until the early 2000s, Enron was extremely powerful, having 
been voted multiple times as the most innovative company in the U.S. (Ellis, 
2002). Hindsight bias for the company's success (e.g., "I knew they would be 
profitable because the company is so innovative") fueled Enron's dynamic 
image. Many analysts decided to invest clients' money in Enron stock. Those 
who remained unconvinced by the new economy hype were deemed as 
old-fashioned and as missing the opportunity for inevitable success (Shell & 
Krantz, 2001). In the early 2000s, Enron was ranked seventh on the Fortune 
500 list (Fortune Five Hundred Largest U.S. Corporations, 2001). 
Yet, when Enron's CEO announced a negative earnings adjustment of 
$1.2 billion in 2001, the public switched from admiring the company's man­
agement practices to holding them in contempt. Soon, the Enron failure be­
came the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. Hindsight bias for the now 
unfavorable outcome information prompted individuals to scorn financial 
advisors for not anticipating what, in retrospect, seemed like the company's 
inevitable failure. As pointed out by a director of research at Off Wall Street, 
a consulting firm, "Wall Street is a fashion show and Enron was fashionable . 
. . the analysts were not analyzing, they were believing. They overlooked 
signs that there might be trouble because they were personally enthused" 
(McNulty, 2001, p. 1). 
HINDSIGHT BIAS FOR DECISION MAKERS' OUTCOMES 
Research Findings. In addition to focusing on observers' reactions to oth­
ers' choices, researchers have examined how individuals show hindsight ef­
fects for their own decision outcomes. Unlike mere observers of others' 
actions, decision makers have something at stake in the results of their 
choices. In more personally relevant settings, individuals show self-serving 
tendencies wherein they accept credit for favorable outcomes, and deny 
blame for unfavorable outcomes (for a review see Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Accordingly, Louie (1999) found that decision makers show hindsight bias 
when their outcomes are favorable (e.g., "I knew I would succeed") but not 
when the results are unfavorable (e.g., "My idea should have worked"). This 
asymmetric hindsight result has been replicated in other studies examining 
decision outcome foreseeability (Louie, Curren, & Harich, 2000; Mark, 
Boburka, Eyssell, Cohen, & Mellor, 2003). 
Additional evidence that individuals show hindsight effects only when 
outcomes agree with their viewpoints comes from studies wherein partici­
pants observe, yet also have prior established opinions about, others' deci­
sion making (e.g., Robbennolt & Sobus, 1997). In a field study, Holzl, 
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Kirchler, and Rodier (2002) found that individuals showed hindsight bias 
for another's decision when the outcome agreed with their prior attitudes. In 
contrast, observers did not show the bias for decision outcomes that were 
contrary to their previous views. 
Real-World Example for Unfavorable Decision Outcomes. Congruent with 
research findings, individuals in real-world settings do not show hindsight 
bias when outcomes are contrary to their decision making. In 2002, a 
19-year-old named Kacey elected to have breast augmentation surgery, 
putting the $4,500 cost on a payment plan. Initially, she enjoyed her new ap­
pearance. However, within a couple of months, she started developing 
health problems such that simple chores like brushing her hair became diffi­
cult. When checking online for information she was horrified to discover 
that her experiences paralleled those of other women who had also had aug­
mentation surgery. Not only did she not show hindsight bias, she incredu­
lously wondered, "Why hadn't anyone said anything?" (Kula, 2004, p. 15). 
Eventually, she had the implants removed. Her healing process included 
60 medical appointments in a year and weekly IV treatments to reduce the 
pain. Her experiences were profiled publicly to prompt teens to consider her 
experience before having augmentation surgery. 
Note that although Kacey did not have hindsight distortion for her unfa­
vorable decision outcome, others observing women in her position have 
shown the bias. Those uninvolved in the decision have been unsympathetic, 
noting that women who chose to have augmentation should have known 
about the high risks (Food and Drug Administration Medical Devices Advi­
sory Committee, 2000). In actuality, informed consent for the surgery is not 
mandatory (Zuckerman, 2001). Hence, these examples are congruous with 
the results of laboratory findings that the pattern of hindsight bias differs 
with the perspective of the individual making hindsight estimates. When 
outcomes are unfavorable, observers show hindsight bias but decision 
makers do not. 
Real-World Example for Favorable Decision Outcomes. It is a bit tricky to 
prove the existence of the bias for decision makers' favorable outcomes. Be­
cause individuals tend to be optimistic about their own futures (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988), they may indeed have truly foreseen their success. Hence, this 
example starts with an unfavorable occurrence, but backtracks to show that 
the outcome likely occurred due to hindsight effects following favorable re­
sults. 
In the 2004 Olympics, the American women's 4 x 100-meter relay team 
ran an exceptional qualifying race. Some observers felt that the team then 
developed hindsight bias and became unduly self-assured. One team mem­
ber suggested that viewers who planned to watch the final should not blink 
or, "you'll miss the race" (Killion, 2004, p. 1). The team had enormous talent 
(the four women were among the top six female sprinters in the world) and 
had reasons to believe, based upon past experiences, that success was likely. 
However, one downside was that they previously had run in only one meet 
36 LOUIE ET Al. 
together. During the final there were problems with the baton exchange, 
which led to their disqualification. A "we knew we were great and will con­
tinue to win" attitude reflects hindsight effects that may have led to 
carelessness in the race. 
In sum, research findings indicate that hindsight bias is prevalent for both 
unfavorable and favorable outcomes when individuals are uninvolved ob­
servers of the decision making. However, the effects are different when indi­
viduals themselves are the decision makers, or when they have strong prior 
attitudes about the decision in question. In those cases, they show the bias 
for outcomes that in their view are favorable, but do not show the bias for 
those that are unfavorable. Real-world examples suggest that the same pat­
tern of bias seen in experimental studies emerges in true decision-making 
settings. In addition, past events provide a backdrop from which to discuss 
consequences of the bias. 
NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES 
OF HINDSIGHT EFFECTS 
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
Bottom-Line Losses. As noted in Table 1, there are both negative and posi­
tive consequences of hindsight effects. 
Regarding the former, real-life scenarios underscore that hindsight bias 
can have disastrous consequences for decision makers and for those who de­
pend upon them. For example, some analysts would claim that the Nobel 
laureates and other prominent economists who formed the hedge fund 
Long-Term Capital Management suffered from the same hindsight-based 
hubris as that shown by Enron executives. Confident from their past suc­
cesses, the former continued investing and borrowing heavily even when 
they were warned that collapsing economies around the world made their 
actions extremely risky (Glassman, 1998). As a result, during the stock mar­
ket turmoil of 1998, Long-Term Capital Management lost 90% of its inves­
tors' money. The negative repercussions were heightened further by bank 
managers who admired the company partners, and who sought to emulate 
their actions by making similar dealings for their own clients. The 
bottom-line consequences of hindsight-based decision making can be 
far-reaching. 
Reduced Rational Thinking. In addition to bottom-line consequences, hind­
sight effects can encourage strong emotions (Stewart, 2003) that reduce ra­
tional thinking and actions. When 2005's Hurricane Katrina proved 
disastrous and fatal for some residents of New Orleans, the public angrily 
criticized the chief of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
for being slow to make lifesaving decisions. One journalist, noting the strong 
tendency to place blame and to show retroactive biases in the aftermath of 
disaster, wrote an article titled, "Hindsight Elevates the Droves Who Saw 
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Katrina Coming" (Kinsley, 2005). Yet, the drive to find a scapegoat can re­
duce rational thinking that might be better placed in dealing with the crisis. 
Impeded Learning from Experience. Hindsight bias can obscure learning 
from past decision-making mistakes. In 2003, the crew of the American 
space shuttle Columbia was doomed as their vehicle fell apart upon reenter­
ing the Earth's atmosphere (Surowiecki, 2004). The wreckage was caused by 
a piece of foam that broke off during lift-off and smashed into the shuttle's 
left wing. Prior to the reentry attempt, a NASA team decided against study­
ing the potential damaging effect of the foam. Had the research instead been 
conducted, it might have prevented the fatal disaster. 
Itwould be easy to show hindsight bias for the team's decision (e.g., "They 
should have known to investigate"). Yet, experts note that doing so would 
be unwise. It would discourage examining larger institutional problems at 
NASA that may have caused the tragedy. According to some analysts, there 
is indeed evidence of not learning from the past; many of the troubles result­
ing in Columbia's tragedy were prevalent when the Challenger shuttle ex­
ploded over a decade earlier (Surowiecki, 2004). A minority report 
produced by members of an oversight committee monitoring NASA noted 
that, "It is difficult to be objective based on hindsight, but it appears that les­
sons that should have been learned have not been" (NASA Accused of 
Breaking Safety Rules in Rush to Launch Discovery, 2005, p. 1). Hence, sim­
plifying the causes of bad outcomes as inevitable and as based upon single 
decisions obscures larger lessons that could be used to avoid future 
disasters. 
Reduced Sensitivity to Victims and Discouraged Preventive Actions. Another 
negative consequence of hindsight effects occurs when those who face unfa­
vorable decision outcomes are not taken seriously. That result can be demor­
alizing, and can hinder the implementation of corrective actions. As noted 
above, some individuals feel that women who have health problems result­
ing from breast augmentation surgery should have known about the risks 
involved in their decisions. Such a conclusion belittles the experiences of 
those suffering ill effects. Combined with the finding that hindsight effects 
increase over time to real-world events (Bryant & Brockway, 1997), the lack 
of empathy for unfavorable outcomes also allows the industry to continue 
without providing more careful warnings. 
POSITNE CONSEQUENCES 
Increased Confidence and Performance. Hindsight bias has been linked to ex­
aggerated levels of confidence (e.g., Bukszar & Connolly, 1988). Although 
biases are often assumed to be negative, if the confidence produced by hind­
sight distortion for past success is contained, then it can result in favorable 
effects. Research findings on self-serving biases (Taylor & Brown, 1988) sug­
gest that individuals who have positive self-views have increased motiva­
tion, persistence, and performance compared to individuals who have less 
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TABLE 1. Applied Aspects of Decision Makers' Hindsight Bias 
Negative and Positive Consequences of Hindsight Effects 
Negative consequences Positive consequences 
Bottom-line losses Increased confidence and performance 
Reduced rational thinking Self-assurance that benefits others 
Impeded learning from experience 
Reduced sensitivity to victims and 
discouraged preventive actions 
Preventing Negative Effects of Decision Makers' Hindsight Bias 
Avoiding hindsight bias Reducing the negative effects of hindsight bias 
Use sound decision-making rules Use diversification strategies 
Establish legislation Make efforts to stay rational 
Seek trustworthy advisors 
Coping with Negative Effects of Observers' Hindsight Bias 
Unfavorable decision outcomes Favorable decision outcomes 
Take advantage of the bias Repeat the success 
Seek the empathy of others Use humor 
Focus on future perspectives of the React gracefully 
decision-making environment 
positive self-views. These are traits that benefit decision makers, as well as 
others with whom their skills are shared. 
An individual who may be benefiting from confidence-encouraging 
hindsight bias is Danica Patrick. In 2005, she broke into what has often been 
considered "a man's world," that of Indy Car racing. Her accomplishments 
included two "pole positions" (fastest qualifier for a race), and being named 
the 2005 Rookie of the Year in Indy Car racing. She appeared on numerous 
television shows, and on the cover of Sports Illustrated (Media, n.d.). When 
asked if she had foreseen all of the wonderful things that had occurred to 
date in her career, Patrick responded that she had. "I've been racing since I 
was 10 and wanted to be in the Indy 500 since I was 12," she said. "I just had 
to have faith that it was going to happen" (Shaffer & Stilley, 2005, p. 2). 
Had she truly foreseen such favorable outcomes in her race performance, 
and in the public reaction to her? Or was she demonstrating hindsight bias and 
confidence based upon past accomplishments? Regardless, provided that she 
does not make overly risky decisions, any hindsight bias in this case may be 
more beneficial than harmful. In interviews, Patrick noted that without such a 
belief in oneself, favorable outcomes will not happen (Burnett, 2005). Her confi­
dence has helped her to pursue her dream, and may encourage others from 
groups not traditionally associated with racing to pursue the sport. 
Self-Assurance That Benefits Others. Somewhat counter-intuitively, even 
stories of tragedies can illustrate past positive effects of hindsight bias. In his 
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book, Into Thin Air, Jon Krakauer (1997) provided a personal account of his 
experience during an ill-fated Mount Everest climb. In that expedition, sev­
eral climbers who reached the summit lost their lives. Among those who 
died were experienced professional guides. To explain how the tragedy oc­
curred, Krakauer cited uncontrollable factors, such as bad weather. He also 
noted that possible errors in judgment-such as the decision not to descend 
at the predetermined safety turn-around time-may have been based upon 
hubris gained from leading previous expeditions. 
Yet, if it is true that hindsight-based overconfidence contributed to the 
guides' deaths, then it is also true that their earlier faith in their abilities pre­
viously benefited them and numerous others. One individual, in addition to 
leading expeditions, was a successful helicopter-skiing guide, spent sum­
mers working for geologists doing research in Antarctica, and helped to run 
a medical clinic created to treat altitude-related illnesses. The guides' 
self-assured decision making allowed them to share their skills with clients 
and associates who might otherwise have missed the adventures. 
Success is a combination of talent, hard work, good timing and, perhaps, 
the hindsight bias of dreams. As long as confidence produced by the bias is 
kept in perspective, it can be beneficial. This brings to light the question of 
how decision makers can prevent overconfidence, and other deleterious ef­
fects resulting from the bias. 
Some might argue that the preventive measures that we are about to dis­
cuss actually target poor decision-making behavior rather than negative 
consequences of hindsight bias. We contend, though, that the conclusion 
that these are poor decisions results from a post hoc analysis of the situation 
after the outcome is known. This is, by definition, a hindsight phenomenon. 
Additionally, hindsight bias and poor decision making are iterative such 
that one can affect the other. Therefore, it is worthwhile to discuss preven­
tive measures devoted to ameliorating the bias and its effects on decision 
making. 
PREVENTING NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF 
DECISION MAKERS' HINDSIGHT BIAS 
A VOIDING HINDSIGHT BIAS 
Use Sound Decision Making Rules. One way for decision makers to avoid 
hindsight effects is to stick with rules that have withstood the test of time. In 
2005, Forbes magazine ranked Warren Buffett as the second-richest man in 
the world (Kroll & Goldman, 2005). One of the very few to accomplish this 
feat solely by making wise investments in other companies, Buffett has long 
attributed his success to consistent principles that, in turn, help him avoid 
retrospective biases. He invests in companies that (a) he knows something 
about, (b) are undervalued or out of favor, (c) have low overhead costs, (d) 
exhibit high growth potential, (e) possess strong market share, (f) exhibit 
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low price-to-earnings ratios, and (g) have strong management in place 
(Hagstrom, 2004). 
Note that these decision-making principles have allowed Buffett to avoid 
the cognitive biases brought about by mob psychology on Wall Street. He 
could easily have fallen prey to hindsight bias. When he did not jump atop­
portunities offered by the dot.com boom, some analysts publicly claimed 
that he was out of touch (cf. Shell & Krantz, 2001). Yet, he avoided the subse­
quent dot.com bust because the investments did not meet his principles. By 
sticking with what he knew, he was less prone to develop hindsight bias, 
and had the strength to resist influence from others' retrospectively biased 
conclusions. 
Establish Legislation. A second way to prevent decision makers' hindsight 
effects is to have legislation that discourages actions that could be poten­
tially harmful to the citizenry and, thereby, could prompt the bias (e.g., "I 
told you so" effects). For example, after the Enron fiasco, there were cries to 
make accounting firms more responsible. The United States Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which developed more rigorous checks and 
balances, and stronger punishments to those who overconfidently flout the 
rules (e.g., Summary of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2005). Those efforts 
should help to curb hindsight bias and the irrational decision making that it 
can produce. Also, referring back to the example about breast augmentation 
surgery, some consumer advocates feel that such risk-oriented products 
should be sold only with regulations that formally warn patients of potential 
dangers (Zuckerman, 2001). With official warnings in place, perhaps fewer 
women would elect to have the surgery, and the number of occurrences of 
the bias for those unfavorable outcomes would be reduced. 
REDUCING THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF HINDSIGHT BIAS 
Use Diversification Strategies. When it is difficult for decision makers to 
avoid showing hindsight distortion, efforts can be made to reduce its dele­
terious effects. For example, individuals can decrease the negative conse­
quences related to unfavorable decision outcomes by using a 
diversification strategy. Referring back to the Enron example, many indi­
viduals invested in the company because they "knew" that the success 
would continue. When the company failed, those who stuck with the basic 
investment principle to diversify were not as hard hit as those who lost ev­
erything by focusing narrowly on Enron. In short, unfavorable conse­
quences can be minimized when individuals are not overly vulnerable to 
decisions that might be tainted by hindsight effects. 
Make Efforts to Stay Rational. Another way to avoid consequences of hind­
sight effects comes from Daniel Kahneman, who won the 2002 Nobel Prize 
for work on the psychology of economic decision making. As noted earlier, 
it is unwise to get emotional about outcomes because such reactions inter­
fere with rational thinking. How does this world-renowned expert keep his 
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feelings in check? He removes himself from the information that gives rise to 
the emotions. Regarding investment decision outcomes, he does not take ev­
ery opportunity to check his portfolio, stating, "''d be swinging from good 
moods to bad all the time ifl did" (Stewart, 2003, p. 83). Of course, those who 
disregard investment-related news run the risk of remaining too long in los­
ing investments. In any case, staying rational-whether or not it includes re­
sisting short-run information-may reduce negative hindsight effects. 
Seek Trustworthy Advisors. An additional way for decision makers to 
avoid irrational choices tainted by hindsight is to obtain advice from exter­
nal parties that do not have a personal stake in the decision making. Success­
ful individuals know the value of seeking independent, trustworthy 
opinions. When musician Prince was inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of 
Fame in 2004, he advised younger musicians, "A real friend and mentor is 
not on your payroll" (Bauder, 2004, p. 1). Outside auditors can keep decision 
makers grounded in reality. 
Although decision makers can make efforts to keep their own hind­
sight bias in check, sometimes it is not possible to avoid negative conse­
quences that occur when observers show the bias. Hence, methods to 
cope with such situations are now presented. 
COPING WITH NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF 
OBSERVERS' HINDSIGHT BIAS 
UNFAVORABLE DECISION OUTCOMES 
Take Advantage of the Bias. One way for a decision maker to cope with 
hindsight effects is to use such bias exhibited by observers to his or her ad­
vantage. Executives at the Coca-Cola Company did that in 1985. Back then, 
in an effort to recapture market share from PepsiCo., they decided to drop 
their original soft drink in favor of a New Coke that had a sweeter, smoother 
taste. More than two years and $4 million spent on research suggested that 
the New Coke would successfully replace the old formula. 
Yet, sales were unsuccessful for the new creation. Brand-loyal and nos­
talgia-prone soda drinkers filled their basements with remaining cases of 
the original formula, which they felt was the only authentic Coke. Consum­
ers and analysts alike felt that company executives should have known that 
removing the original tried and true drink was a mistake. Coke executives 
responded swiftly to the unfavorable outcome by building upon what it 
seemed like they should have known. The company brought the original 
Coke (now labeled "Coke Classic") back on the market after only three 
months. Virtually every major newspaper featured the return of the "old 
Coke" on the front page. By the end of that year, Coke Classic was outselling 
New Coke and Pepsi, thus helping the company to regain and keep the 
number one position (New Coke, 2005). 
The action was so swift, and the reaction to the classic drink so favorable, 
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that some observers then had hindsight bias for the second decision to re-re­
lease the original drink. They claimed that it was obvious in retrospect that 
the company action to halt and to re-release the flagship beverage was all 
part of a marketing ploy to revive interest in that original drink. Coke's pres­
ident and chief operating officer, Donald Keough, responded to the hind­
sight bias for both the unfavorable and favorable outcomes. He claimed, 
"Some critics will say Coca-Cola made a marketing mistake. Some cynics 
will say that we planned the whole thing. The truth is we are not that dumb, 
and we are not that smart" (Mikkelson, 1999, p. 6). Hence, the ultimate suc­
cess of Coke Classic is an example of how a company used observers' hind­
sight bias and lessons from an unfavorable outcome to its advantage. 
Seek the Empathy of Others. Research has shown that asking participants to 
explain alternative outcomes reduces hindsight bias (e.g., Tomassini & 
Grudnitski, 1980). Decision makers dealing with observers' hindsight bias 
may cope better with the support of those for whom alternative outcomes are 
readily accessible. Often, individuals sharing the same background or profes­
sion as the decision makers are best able to recall the pre-outcome point of 
view. 
For example, hours after pop star Michael Jackson was cleared on ten 
counts of child molestation in 2005, second-guessing the decision to prose­
cute was, for some, irresistible. Legal analysts questioned the sensibility of 
pursuing the case with statements like, "Those just aren't the kinds of cases 
that prosecutors with good judgment should be bringing" (Broder, 2005, p. 
9A). Yet, some fellow prosecutors unconnected with the case were sympa­
thetic. As one said about the district attorney who brought Jackson to trial, 
"He had an obligation to put his evidence before a jury and let them decide" 
(Broder, 2005, p. 9A). Such statements by those who understood the fore­
sight situation surrounding the case were supportive of the 
hindsight-maligned prosecutor. 
Focus on Future Perspectives of the Decision-Making Environment. When de­
cisions have unfavorable outcomes, and everyone is saying, "I could have 
told you your idea would fail," sometimes the best course of action is to be­
lieve that the decision and associated outcome will one day be seen in a dif­
ferent light. An example of the value of waiting for future perspectives 
comes from Paul Schell, who was the mayor of Seattle in 1999. In December 
of that year, a man suspected of having ties to Canadians with links to 
Osama bin Laden was caught trying to drive across the Canadian-U.S. bor­
der with bomb-making materials. Schell decided to cancel much of Seattle's 
New Year's Eve festivities (U.S. Takes Last-Minute Terrorist Precautions at 
Home, Abroad, 1999). He received widespread criticism from constituents 
who anticipated a special celebratory welcome to the year 2000. In addition, 
the decision made the city an object of national derision, as Seattle became 
the subject of jokes on late night network television shows.lt was not until21 
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months later, after the 9 I 11 tragedy in New York City, that others were more 
convinced about Schell's decision (Feit, Jenniges, Kearney, & Savage, 2002). 
Another way to "wait out negative effects" is to believe that in the long 
run, even decisions with very unfavorable outcomes can be vindicated. In 
1968, African-American student-athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos 
placed first and third, respectively, in the 200-meter sprint at the Olympics 
in Mexico City. At that time, the U.S. and much of the rest of the world strug­
gled with civil rights. While on the victory stand, in an effort to draw atten­
tion to these issues, the athletes each raised a fist in a Black-Power salute. 
The action violated the Olympic ban on expressing political speech during 
the medal ceremony. Instead ofbenefiting from the praise often given to vic­
torious athletes, the two were banished from the Olympics and received 
death threats. As many athletes had backed out of similar plans to protest, 
Smith and Carlos were undoubtedly told in retrospect that their decision to 
demonstrate was unwise. 
Nonetheless, their actions drew attention to important societal concerns in 
the United States and, globally, to the issue of an Olympic ban on athletes 
from nations with apartheid policies. Decades later, many viewed Smith and 
Carlos's actions at the Olympics not as disgraceful but as courageous. More 
than 30 years after their protest, they were immortalized in a statue depicting 
their actions (SJSU Statue is a Fitting Tribute, 2005). Over the years, they have 
held that they made the right decision. Similarly, decision makers who face 
unfavorable outcomes can cope with hindsight bias by holding to their con­
victions that their actions will be viewed positively by others in the future. 
Having suggested means for coping with observers' hindsight bias for un­
favorable decision outcomes, below are ideas for dealing with the bias for fa­
vorable outcomes. 
FAVORABLE"DECISION OUTCOMES 
Repeat the Success. Observers who show hindsight bias for a decision 
maker's good fortune can undercut the energy and creativity that the indi­
vidual put into earning his or her achievement. Most individuals who have 
worked hard do not want their favorable outcomes attributed to taking fore­
seeable and easy paths to success. Over 20 years ago, author Jackie Collins 
decided to write Hollywood Wives, a fictional story about the social scene in 
the Los Angeles area. After the book became a bestseller, she was frustrated 
when others claimed that her topic was obvious and simple; they felt that 
they, too, could have achieved her success. It was harder to undercut her tal­
ent, however, when her continued efforts resulted in (to date) 22 New York 
Times bestsellers Qackie Collins Biography, n.d.). Repeatedly writing popu­
lar novels helped her to prove her skills within her genre, and made it more 
difficult for others to downplay her achievements. 
Use Humor. Another way to cope with hindsight bias for favorable outcomes 
is with humor. Entertainer Dolly Parton decided to release a song about 
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on-again/off-again relationships called, "Here You Come Again." A huge hit, 
its catchy melody and universal appeal led hindsight-influenced observers to 
claim that its formula was simple. One went as far to claim that a "monkey" 
could have attained success with the song, to which the good-natured Parton 
replied, "A monkey DID!" (E! Entertainment Television, 2005). Humor dif­
fused any tension she may have felt when others belittled her work. Note that, 
similar to the Coca-Cola executives, she used hindsight bias exhibited by ob­
servers to her advantage. She made it into a memorable self-deprecating quote 
that enhanced her appeal. 
React Gracefully. Given the title of this article, perhaps it is appropriate that 
our final example pertains to the social grace shown by American football 
player Tom Brady. In five months, Brady went from backup quarterback to 
winning the 2001 Super Bowl. Not picked for professional football until the 
sixth round of the National Football League draft, many of his fans claimed 
that his talent should have been foreseeable. An interviewer asked him if he 
ever felt the urge to say, "I told you so" (Kroft, 2005, p. 2). Brady responded, 
"It would be too easy to do. I mean, why be a jerk? ... Let other people say it. 
It sounds so much better when someone else says it" (Kroft, 2005, p. 2). 
Brady provides yet another method for dealing well with observers' 
hindsight bias. 
CONCLUSION 
This overview has outlined the effects of hindsight bias in decision-making 
settings, and has discussed both negative and positive aspects of the bias. 
Perhaps the mechanisms suggested to reduce negative effects of retrospec­
tive thinking-or to cope with it-will be further refined in the research that 
will continue on the intriguing bias of hindsight distortion. 
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